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Introduction 
In the Preamble of the Cotonou-Agreement, both the EU and the ACP countries 
express  being  “anxious  to  respect  basic  labour  rights,  taking  account  of  the 
principles laid down in the relevant conventions of the ILO” (OD0). This reference 
to ILO-type, fundamental labour rights creates many expectations with regard to 
the EU’s commitment to promote labour standards in ACP-countries. In practice, 
however,  the  EU  seems  to  be  reluctant  to  use  its  market  power  to  promote 
compliance  with  fundamental  labour  standards,  particularly  when  comparing 
with  other  political  elements  of  the  agreement,  such  as  the  promotion  of 
(general) human rights, good governance and democratic principles. The question 
is, how can we explain this? 
The objectives of this paper are therefore two-fold. First of all we aim to critically 
review  the  EU’s  commitment  to  the  promotion  of  labour  standards    in  ACP-
countries, by looking a the concrete implementation of the main political pillars of 
the  Cotonou-Agreement  since  its  first  signature.  Secondly,  we  will  try  to 
formulate  an  alternative  explanation  for  this  lack  of  attention  for  labour 
standards, based on a model where two elements are crucial: the prominence of 
the Member States when negotiating association agreement and the role played 
by national political parties when societal interests are to  be aggregated.   
Labour Standards and the EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements 
As  a  result  of  an  increasingly  competitive  global  economy,  the  link  between 
labour  standards  and  international  trade  agreements  has  been  the  object  of 
controversial political debates both at national and international levels.  On one 
side of the political debate, proponents of a “social clause”, mostly trade unions 
and  industrialized  countries,  usually  invoke  fears  of  unfair  competition 
(engendering a “race to the bottom”) and moral concerns when advocating a clear 
linkage  between  international  labour  standards  and  the  liberalization  of 
international  trade    (Bhagwati,  2001).    Opponents  of  this  linkage,  usually 
employers’ organizations and developing countries, base their argumentation on 
the questionable claim that linking social standards to trade in fact represents a 
disguised form of protectionism (Lee, 1997). Higher labour standards are seen as 
additional factors hampering the growth potential of developing countries.  
At the World Trade Organization, the linkage of international labour standards to 
trade  has  been  discussed  during  several  occasions.  Despite  of  the  efforts  of 
several  governmental  and  non-governmental  proponents  of  a “social clause”  to 
include these international labour standards to the global trade agenda,  the 1996 
Singapore  Ministerial  Declaration  and  later  the  Doha  Declaration  of  2001  
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somehow consolidated a practice in the other direction.1 The International Labour 
Organization has been recognized as the only institution competent and capable 
of  dealing  with  multilateral  harmonization  of  labour  standards,  also  in  their 
connection with international trade.  
Unsatisfied with this consensus and unhappy about the reluctance of powerful 
groups of developing countries inside the WTO to include the most fundamental 
international labour standards to the global trade agenda, several industrialized 
countries  usually  considered  as  proponents  of  a  social  clause  (such  as  some 
Member States of the European Union and the United States) have been trying to 
bypass  this  status-quo  by  promoting  the  national  internalization  of    these 
standards through preferential trading arrangements. In a bilateral or unilateral 
context,  a stronger bargaining power clearly results in  an increased capacity to 
promote compliance to international labour standards by trading partners in the 
developing world.  
In  the  European  Union,  the  best  example  of  a  preferential  trading  scheme 
conditioning market access to the promotion of international labour standards can 
be  found  in  the  Generalized  System  of  Preferences.  Through  this  trade  policy 
instrument, unilateral trade preferences may be granted (the “carrot”-component) 
or  withdrawn  (the  “stick”-component)  in  accordance  with  efforts  made  by 
beneficiary countries to promote these standards.2   
Besides  the  GSP,    the  European  Union  recognizes    the  promotion  of  labour 
standards as to be an important element of bilateral trade agreements negotiated 
with third countries (OD 2). Almost all EU bilateral trade agreements contain  a 
chapter or paragraph on “cooperation on social issues”  and  a clear reference to 
some  of  the  core  international  labour  standards  is  made  in  the  Trade  and 
Development  Cooperation  Agreement  with  South-Africa  and  the    Association 
Agreement with Chile (OD3&OD4). 
A first glance at these social provisions might create the impression that the EU is 
unambiguously  committed  to  promoting  fundamental  labour  standards 
worldwide,  especially because  the  benchmarks  used  to  evaluate  the respect  of 
these  labour  rights  by  the  contracting  parties  seem  to  be  stemming  from 
international rather than national labour law (Grynberg and Qalo, 2005) . When 
looking at the enforcement mechanisms of these “social provisions”, however, the 
picture  becomes  more  blurry.  In  its  latest  communications,  the  European 
                                                             
1 Cf. Par.8  “We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding internationally 
recognized core labour standards.We take not of work under way in the International Labour Organization on the 
social dimension of globalization” (OD1)  
2 For a critical account on the Generalized System of Preferences and the ability of the EU to promote international 
labour standards through this preferential trading scheme: (Orbie, 2006)  
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Commission  has  rejected  a  sanctions-based  approach  to  labour  standards.
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Instead, the emphasis is put on the institutional set up of dialogue (information 
exchange) and the provision of technical assistance with the aim of  improving 
domestic legislation  and  enforcement. The methods  used  for the promotion  of 
labour standards are thus more in line with the “soft governance” - approach used 
by the International Labour Organization.   
Fundamental Labour Rights as an “essential element” of the Cotonou-
Agreement 
In the EU’s web of bilateral trade-agreements with third countries (and essential 
elements  and  social  clauses  sticking  to  it),  future  Economic  Partnership 
Agreements with the ACP-countries seem to occupy a special place.  
Already  in  the  Preamble  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement,  signed  in  2000  by  15  EU 
Member  States  and  77  ACP-countries,  the  contracting  parties  express  being 
“anxious to respect basic labour rights, taking account of the principles laid down in 
the  relevant  conventions  of  the  ILO”  (OD0).  This  reference  to  ILO-type, 
fundamental  labour  rights  cannot  be  found  in  any  of  the  preambles  of  other 
association  or  trade  agreements  with  third  countries.  Moreover,  a  strong 
commitment  to  respect  fundamental  social  rights  is  reiterated  in  two  other 
provisions of the agreement. First, it forms an integral part of the “essential and 
fundamental elements”, where it stands on an equal footing with the other main 
political pillars of the Agreement such as human rights, democratic principles, the 
rule of law  and good  governance.4 In this respect, Article 9, including both the 
essential  and  fundamental  elements,  states  that:  “the  Parties  undertake  to 
promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights, be they civil 
and political, or economic, social and cultural” (OD0). 
The agreement also determines that human rights (including fundamental social 
rights),  democratic  principles  and  the  rule  of  law  are  to  be  the  subject  of  a 
structured political dialogue (Article 8). Besides that, just like in other trade and 
cooperation  agreements,  these  essential  elements  are  linked  with  a  non-
execution clause (Fierro, 2001: 43).  A substantial breach of these elements may 
lead to an invitation to consultations and eventually, “appropriate measures” may 
be taken, according to the procedure described in Article 96 (OD0). 
Next to the prominent role of social rights in the essential element, other labour 
rights provisions were included in the trade chapter of the Agreement (Article  50: 
“Trade and Labour Standards”), which formed the basis for future negotiations of 
                                                             
3 Speech Peter Mandelson, “Trade policy and Decent Work Intervention”, at the EU Decent Work Conference, 5 
december 2006,  OD 5 and OD 6  
4 Note here that human rights (including social rights), democratic principles and the rule of law constitute the 
“essential elements” whereas  good governance is seen as a “fundamental element”.  
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the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA’s).  More, in the EPA-negotiations’ 
directives adopted by  the Council of Ministers in 2003,  it was stated that in the 
preambles of these future agreements special reference would be made to  
“the commitment  of  the parties  to  the respect  for human rights, including core 
labour  rights,  democratic  principles  and  the  rule  of  law,  which  constitute  the 
essential  elements  of  the  ACP-EC  Partnership  and  to  good  governance,  which 
constitutes  a  fundamental  element  of  the  ACP-EC  Partnership”  (OD7).  The 
revision of the Cotonou-Agreement in 2005 did not alter the importance given to 
fundamental  social rights in  any  way. On  the contrary, it provided  for  a  more 
structured  and  robust  political  dialogue  prior  to  consultations  in  the  sense  of 
Article 96 by clarifying in detail the modalities of this dialogue. 
Despite  of  all  the  formal  attention  given  to  fundamental  labour  rights,  a 
paragraph  in  the  Cotonou-Agreeement  mentioning  that  “fundamental  social 
rights  should  not  be  used  for  protectionist  purposes”  (Article  50.  3)  (OD0), 
somehow  suggests  that  the  relationship  between  human  rights,  democratic 
principles, rule of law and good governance on the one hand and fundamental 
social rights on the other hand is not as equal as it seems. More than the formal 
aspects  of  the  agreement,  however,  the  practice  of  implementation  of  the 
Cotonou-acquis  has  shown  how  respect  for  fundamental  social  rights  has  not 
been  pursued  by  the  EU  with  the  same  degree  of  assertiveness  as  the  other 
essential and fundamental elements. 
Since  the  signature  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement,  at  least  seven  consultation 
procedures in the sense of article 98 have been started. The most notorious and 
extended  case  of  consultations  were  held  between  the  European  Union  and 
Zimbabwe. Based on a UK initiative, the Council sent a letter to the Zimbabwean 
authorities  to  initiate  consultation  meetings  in  November  2001.  Previously, 
though laws  were  adopted in Zimbabwe, one on public safety threatening  any 
person found guilty of seeking to overthrow the government or undermining the 
authority  of  the  president  to  the  death  penalty  or  life  imprisonment,  and  the 
other  amending  the  electoral  law  to  exclude  most  Zimbabwe  nationals  living 
abroad from the right of vote during presidential elections to be held on 9 and 10 
March 2002 (OD8).  
The direct cause of the initiation of consultations, however, was the refusal of 
Zimbabwean  authorities    to  accept  the  European  offer  to  send  an  exploratory 
electoral  observers’  mission  for  these  elections.  The  invitation  letter  clearly 
outlined  the  EU’s  concerns  about  political  violence,  the  preparation  and 
organization of free and fair elections, respect for the freedom of the press, the 
independence of the judicial system and the illegal occupation of farms owned by 
white settlers (OD9).  
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Consultations were closed on January 28 as the General Affairs Council decided 
to inflict targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe if authorities prevented the deployment 
of EU observers and  the access of international media to cover the elections, if 
serious  deterioration  in  the  situation  on  the  ground  was  noted  (in  terms  of 
violation of human rights or attacks on the opposition) and if the evaluation of 
the elections reveal that  they  were not free  and fair (OD10).  As the electoral 
process showed many shortcomings, to the extent that several members of the 
electoral observation mission had to leave the country,  the Commission adopted 
a  text  with  possible  sanctions  and  a  decision  was  taken  by  unanimity  in  the 
Council  to implement smart sanctions (mainly the freeze of assets, visa bans and 
an  embargo  on  weapon  exports)  on    February  18  2002  (OD11).  The 
implementation of these sanctions has been extended in 2004 and more recently 
in February 2007. 
Besides the Zimbabwean case, other consultation procedures with less dramatic 
consequences were held, among others with Ivory Coast and Guinea. In the case 
of  Ivory  Coast,  consultations  were  launched  following  the  country’s  failure  to 
implement  a  previous  national  agreement  on  the  preparation  of  the  country’s 
2005 elections. Next to concerns on the human rights situation particularly in the 
northern part of the country, the EU was especially displeased by the obstacles 
put by the Ivorian authorities to a EU financed audit of the management of the 
country’s cocoa sector (OD12). In the Guinean case, consultations were held in 
2004  with  the  same  objective  of  taking  a  closer  look  at  the  worsening  of  the 
democratization process, criticized  by  the  EU  since  the presidential  elections  of 
December 2003 (OD13). 
Not all consultation processes were the result of a deterioration of the domestic 
political situation in ACP-countries. Following a “carrot”-logic, the EU decided for 
instance to gradually relaunch cooperation both with Liberia in 2002 and Togo in 
2004 based on results of successful consultations. In the case of Liberia, some 
specific measures taken by the Liberian government led to a partial relaunch of 
cooperation projects and the re-programming of allocations available under the 8
th 
EDF. Commitments implemented by the Liberian government included, among 
others, judicial  enquiries into  various  members  of  the  security  forces  allegedly 
involved  in  human  rights  abuses,  the  organization  of  human  rights  training 
programmes for security forces, the announcement that a national reconciliation 
forum would be held in Liberia, reinforcement of electoral committees and plans 
to improve public management of tax revenues from forestry (OD14)  
In the case of Togo, cooperation had been suspended since 1993. After successful 
consultations were held between April and November 2004 in which the situation 
of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  (particularly  press  freedom  and  
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proper dialogue mechanisms with the opposition)  were assessed, the Togolese 
government  submitted  a  list  of  commitments  that  would  be  verified  in  the 
months to come.  (OD15) 
Even though Togo succeeded relatively quickly in improving the  human rights 
situation  in  the  country,  full  resumption  of  cooperation  was  only  possible  in 
August  2006  when  a  Global  Agreement  between  all  political  fractions  in  the 
Togolese society was  signed.  Some  additional requirements were forwarded  at 
that  moment  by  the  EU,  including  the  provision  of  an  electoral  framework 
acceptable  to  all  parties  to  move  towards  free  and  transparent  legislative 
elections,  the definition of a legal framework for the funding of political parties, 
the pursuit of the process of decentralization, the review of the National Human 
Rights Commission and its make-up, and the establishment of an office of the UN 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Lomé (OD16). 
The cases above show very clearly that the emphasis of the EU’s requirements in 
these  consultations  were  on  enforcement  of  democratic  principles  (and 
particularly  the  organization  of  free  and  fair  elections),  good  governance  and  
fundamental freedoms. Fundamental social rights did not even play a marginal 
role.  
Some might argue that art. 96 consultations are instruments of “last resort”, only 
used when  addressing  the most serious political problems experienced by ACP-
countries. But even when looking at political declarations issued by institutions 
such as the Presidency or the European Parliament  where reference is made to 
provisions of the Cotonou-Agreement or the importance of  some of its “essential 
elements”,  the  prominence  of  democratic  principles,  rule  of  law  and  good 
governance is incontestable.5 One notable exception was the Declaration of the 
Danish Presidency concerning Zimbabwe in January  2003 stating that (OD 19):  
“The EU would like to express its profound concern by the recent arrests of ten 
trade union leaders and the allegation of mistreatment during the period of their 
arrest.  As  a  member  if  the  ILO,  the  government  of  Zimbabwe  has  committed 
itself to respecting fundamental principles and rights at work. (..) The EU urges 
the government of Zimbabwe to engage in a political dialogue with civil society 
and to respect the rights of trade unions”. The fact that the Danish Presidency 
refers to Zimbabwe’s obligations as a member of the ILO and not as a contracting 
                                                             
5 See in this respect :  
• Declaration of the French Presidency on the setting up of the “Independent Electoral Commission” in Togo (12 
July 2000, OD17), Declaration of the French Presidency concerning the decision of Ivory Coast’s Supreme Court 
to allow only 5 out of 19 presidential candidates to stand for elections (12 October 2000),  Declaration of the 
Belgian Presideny on the deterioration of the political and security situations in Haiti (28 December 2001, OD18), 
Declaration  of  the  Irish  Presidency  on  the  violent  clampdown  of  peaceful  demonstrations  organized  by  the 
National Constitutional Assembly in Zimbabwe (11 February 2004, OD19) 
• Resolutions of the European Parliament:  Ivory Coast (18 December 2000, OD20),  Haiti (15 March 2004, OD21), 
Nigeria (26 April 2004, OD22)  
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party to the Cotonou-Agreement is particularly revealing for the importance given 
to social rights in the Cotonou-framework (OD19). 
The examples above have shown very clearly that labour standards do not  seem 
to be a priority in the EU’s  agenda towards ACP-countries. Even though they are 
formally  included  in  the  main  political  pillars  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement,  in 
practice  they  seem  to  be  absorbed  by  other  political  objectives,  such  as  the 
promotion  of  democratic  principles,  good  governance  and  the  rule  of  law.  The 
question is, how can we explain this? 
Lack of “fear of globalization” as one possible explanation 
The discussion on the link between labour standards and international trade is 
embedded  in  a  much  larger  debate  in  political  economy  on  the  impact  of 
globalization on different groups in society.  In this respect, several economists 
have argued that the main opposition to globalization in  industrialized societies 
comes  from  labour.6  Sapir,  for  instance,  compared  the  political  economy  of 
domestic adjustment to globalization both in the US and Europe (Sapir, 2001). He 
concluded that labour voices less opposition to globalization in the EU than in the 
US, because there is less “globalization fear” in Europe and this for the following 
reason.  In the US,  globalization  generated more wealth but  also more income 
inequality  and  adjustment problems than in Europe. In the EU, where  welfare 
systems  are  more  generous,  globalization  generated  less  wealth  but  also  less 
income inequality and labour adjustment than in the US. Particularly the median 
voter suffered less in Europe than in the US. “Outsiders”, such as young people 
and  immigrants  paid  the  price  in  terms  of  unemployment  (Sapir,  2001:202). 
Consequently, labour voices less opposition to globalization in Europe than in the 
US. 
Sapir’s analysis might offer a simple and straightforward explanation for the fact 
that the promotion of labour standards does not figure on the EU’s agenda in its 
relations with the ACP-countries. Because of  the “buffer” created by European 
welfare states and the limited role of the ACP economies in international trade 
there  might  just  be  a  lack  of  “globalization  fear”  among  citizens  and  labour 
activists in Europe, at least when it concerns trade with ACP countries. Due to 
the limited pressure of labour activism, EU decision-makers would not be inclined 
to  invest  any    negotiating  capital  on  this  for  most    ACP  countries  quite 
controversial issue. 
However,  Sapir’s  analysis  does  not  seem  to  offer  a  completely  satisfactory 
explanation.  Basic  labour  rights  to  be  protected  consist  of  ILO  “core  labour 
                                                             
6 For an overview of this debate see for instance (Lee, 1996)  
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standards” such as the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, 
the prohibition of forced labour, equality of treatment and non-discrimination in 
employment and the effective abolition of the worst forms of child labour. These 
core labour standards have an important human rights’ dimension as well  (Lee, 
1997:5).  Consequently,  proponents  of  the  inclusion  of  labour  standards  into 
international  trade  agreements  have  not  only  advocated  this  linkage  with  the 
objective of protecting domestic workers from unfair competition and a “race-to-
the-bottom”, but also because of evident moral concerns about inhuman labour 
conditions in trade partners of the developing world.  
Indeed, in the case of the European Union and the ACP countries, it seems that 
federations  of  trade  unions  at  national,  European  (ETUC)  and  international 
(ICFTU)  have  been  mobilized  and  have  lobbied  for  the  inclusion  of  labour 
standards in the Economic Partnership Agreements.7 The reality of some activism 
of the labour movement with respect to these negotiations does not correspond 
completely with what is to be expected from Sapir’s analysis. Assuming that next 
to the “lack of fear of globalization” other factors seem to play a role, we choose to 
turn to one possible factor, which is strongly related with the European decision-
making  context  in  which  bilateral  trade  or  association  agreements  with  third 
countries are negotiated. 
The negotiation of bilateral free trade agreements and the prominence 
of the Member States 
During international trade negotiations involving the European Union, Member 
States  are  usually  considered  to  participate  only  at  “arms-length”  in  the 
negotiation process.  Once they have specified the terms of the negotiations in a 
negotiation mandate, an act of delegation takes place in favour of the European 
Commission  who  negotiates  on  behalf  of  the  Member  States.  Contrary  to  the 
United States where different agreements can be concluded in the framework of 
one single trade negotiating authority law, in the European Union one specific 
mandate has to be adopted for each trade agreement. Despite of this delegation-
logic,  the  involvement  of  the  Member  States  in  these  negotiations  becomes 
crucial both when these trade agreements involve trade-related matters such as 
intellectual property rights, trade in services and investment rules (Young, 2002) 
and  when  these  trade  negotiations  are  combined  with  the  establishment  of  a 
                                                             
7 See for instance the speech of John Monks, General Secretary of ETUC at the “Decent Work Conference”, in 
which he states that: “There is willingness to promote employment, social cohesion and decent work for all in all 
EU external policies, bilateral and regional relations and dialogues. But the real weight of the EU relies on trade, 
and we do not discern the same willingness to use that asset to promote the agenda. Our trade agreements must all 
be made vehicles to promote our values, be they bilateral or in  the WTO context”. (High-level Conference on 
“Promoting decent work for all”, 4.12.2006), or the decisions adopted by the 17
th World Congress of the ICFTU, 
stating that “regional trade agreements should integrate respect for trade union rights in their rules and practices. 
The ICFTU will cooperate with the appropriate trade union organizations to exert pressure in this direction” (Point 
16, Decisions of the 17
th World Congress of the ICFTU, 3-7.04.2000)  
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political “association” between the European Community and a third state in the 
sense of art. 310 of the EC Treaty, which was the case of the Cotonou-Agreement 
and will be the case for the future EPA’s.  
In  these  cases,  “mixed  agreements”  are  being  negotiated  where  both  Member 
States  and  the  European  Community  have  shared  powers  to  conclude  the 
agreements.    Mixed  agreements  have  two  important  implications  in  terms  of 
European policy-making on trade. First of all, unanimity is required in the Council 
of  Ministers  for  those  matters  that  touch  upon  Member  States’  competences. 
Secondly, the agreements need to be ratified both by the European Community 
and  all  27  Member  States  according  to  their  respective  national  ratification 
procedures. 
When dealing with the inclusion of social clauses in trade agreements, the picture 
becomes  even  more  favourable  towards  the  (institutional)  interests  of  the 
Member States. The main reason for this is that different ambiguities persist with 
regard to the EC’s external competence to promote international labour standards 
(Novitz, 2002). Even though the ECJ’s Opinion 2/91 has established an implicit 
exclusive  competence  for  the  European  Community  to  negotiate  social 
agreements related to health and  safety at the work place, some fundamental 
labour rights, such as the right to strike, remain a national internal and external 
competence.
8 Thus, only the Member States are entitled to negotiate agreements 
touching upon these matters. 
The  prominent  role  of  the  Member  States  in  the  negotiation  of  association 
agreements has important implications for the inclusion of labour standards into 
the  bilateral  trade  agreements  negotiated  by  the  EU.  In  order  to  reach  the 
negotiation table or, in the opposite case, in order to be explicitly excluded from 
this  table,  the  intensity  of  the  preferences  among  national  constituencies 
regarding  labour  standards  has  to  be  sufficiently  strong  to  survive  both  the 
delegation act from the Member States towards the European Commission and 
the  aggregation  mechanisms  at  the  national levels.  Assuming  that  the  second 
process will be more determining for the inclusion of labour standards than the 
first one, we believe it is important to focus on the aggregation of interests at the 
national level and the role played by political parties in this process. 
The aggregative role of European political parties: impact on labour 
standards 
All European Union  Member  States can  be characterized  as party democracies, 
that is,  as parliamentary democracies in which party discipline in parliament is 
                                                             
8 Art. 137.5 TEC  
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strong and in which internal party control mechanisms supersede the normal role 
that parliamentary majorities have in controlling governments. Indeed, As Storm 
has  argued,  two characteristics central  to parliamentary democracy, dissolution 
power and confidence vote, tend to reinforce centralized party leadership control 
especially over the party’s MPs.
9 
Also characteristically of these European political parties is the central role that is 
played by their extra-parliamentary organizations. European political parties are 
not just the result of the need for members of parliament to organize themselves 
in groups of like-minded parliamentarians. Rather, they are organizations created 
outside parliament that happen to have a representation in parliament too. The 
parliamentary party is then an instrument of the extra-parliamentary party, and 
MPs act as agents of that extra-parliamentary party. The same holds for the party 
members  that  happen  to  be  members  of  the  government.  They  also  act  as 
instruments  of  their  extra-parliamentary  party  and  are  as  such  accountable  to 
that party. Governmental and parliamentary leadership positions are then, mere 
derivatives of the leadership positions in the extra-parliamentary party. This is not 
without  important  consequences  as  “a  party  will  select  those  individuals  as 
leaders  who  are  considered  most  likely  to  achieve  the  party’s  collective  goals” 
(Müller, 2000: 319, emphasis added). Second, these leaders are supposed to act on 
the  basis  of  these  collective  goals  when  monitoring  the  party’s  MPs,  and 
enforcing party discipline upon them. It may be the case that the role and impact 
of extra-parliamentary parties have weakened since the 1980s, and that the role 
of the parliamentary party has become stronger (Katz and Mair, 2002: 123-125), 
the  fact  that  MPs  operate  within  a  context  of  parliamentary  government  still 
results  in  a  situation  where  party  leaders  –  now  more  in  their  capacity  of 
government leaders  – control  to  a large  extent  the degrees  of  freedom  within 
which  individual  MPs  have  to  operate.  The  “parliamentarization”,  or  even 
“governmentalization”  of  parties  has  not  substantially  reduced  their  level  of 
centralization. It has only shifted the centre of intra-party authority away from 
the extra-parliamentary party. 
(Extra-parliamentary) political parties act as aggregating organizations in society. 
They  aggregate  and  represent  an  array  of  societal  interests  and  concerns.  In 
doing so, they take into consideration both specific interests, and the interest – as 
they perceive it – of society as a whole, this in addition to the interests of the 
political party as organization. Important is here that this weighing of interests 
                                                             
9 Dissolution power refers to the ability of government leaders to dissolve parliament, and thus, to expose the MPs 
to an electoral verdict. The vote of  confidence  refers to the parliamentary  majority’s  dismissal power vis-à-vis 
government. It is a characteristic that “sets parliamentary government apart from other regime types” but that also 
“enables the cabinet and the party leadership to dominate the legislative branch” (Strom, 2004: 69).  
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takes place in the context of concerns for the collective interests of the nation as 
a whole.  
National political parties  are  well-prone  to  such  an  exercise  as  they internalize 
tensions  and  conflicts  among  a  wide  array  of  societal  interests  within  their 
organizational structure. What Garrett and Lange ( Garrett and Lange, 1996: 60) 
have  observed  for  umbrella  associations  of  labour  unions  may  also  apply  to 
political parties. Umbrella organizations have a mitigating impact on distributional 
conflicts  among  their  members.  They  have  the  ability  to  balance  the  political 
benefits  of  granting  rents  to  specific  members  against  the  political  costs  and 
benefits of the overall aggregate welfare effects of such granting, especially when 
the  former  is  detrimental  to  the  latter.  Umbrella  organizations  internalize 
distributional conflicts among their members and try to resolve them within the 
wider  perspective  of  the  aggregate  impact  of  the  possible  solutions  for  such 
conflicts.  
Group leaders play a prominent role here. In their search for solutions they can 
use longer time horizons, wider than local or sector-specific perspectives, and the 
ultimate ability to enforce compliance on the rank-and-file. The same holds to a 
large  extent  for  the  national leaders  of  strong  and centralized political parties. 
They can also ask sacrifices today in the expectation of benefits tomorrow. They 
might  also    supersede  the  local  or  sector-specific  scale  of  interests  and  assess 
them  in  a  broader  (national)  perspective.  And  ultimately,  they  can  enforce 
compliance  among  their  MPs  as  they  can  strongly  affect  the  office-keeping 
prospects  of  these.  Specific  sectoral  or  local  demands  are  filtered  away,  or  are 
smoothened, in such an aggregating logic. 
The perspective from which they engage in this aggregation reflects the scale on 
which the party is organized. National parties will tend to weigh specific sectoral 
or geographically concentrated interests against the national aggregate effects of 
the  policy-choices  they  make.  Regional  parties  will  do  the  same  but  then 
concerning  the  regional  aggregate  effects  of  their  choices.  This  aggregative 
capacity of the political parties is only relevant to the extent that they are able to 
control the holders of political offices, be it in parliament or in government. In the 
absence  of  such  control,  or  in  the  case  of  weak  control,  the  logic  of  the 
aggregation by individual governmental officeholders instead of the political party 
as a whole will matter, and with it, the geographical scale on which they operate.  
That scale is to  a large extent determined by the  geographical scale (reach) of 
their electoral district. The size of the electoral district largely depends on the kind 
(type) of government institution, which  may be local, regional, or national. The 
smaller  the  scale  however,  the  higher  the  probability  that  geographically 
concentrated interests  will be  able  to capture  locally  elected  officeholders,  and  
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thus to weigh on their policy-choices. This is due to the higher probability of a 
lower diversity of interests within the electoral district of the officeholder, which 
limits the ability of such a holder to balance one local interest against another in 
determining  his  stance  on  policy-issues.  For  parliamentary  bodies  were  such 
officeholders have a seat, the consequence is that policymaking is submitted to 
the  logic  of  logrolling  rather  than  to  the  logic  of  an  integrative  aggregation 
process in which the collective interest matters substantially too.  
In the case of strong political party control, the scale at which the political party 
operates will supplant to a large extent the scale of the electoral districts.
10 Given 
the  wider  geographical  span  of  that  scale,  a  higher  diversity  of  interests  is 
probable,  and  with  it  the  capacity  of  the  officeholders  to  balance  different 
interests against each other and against the aggregate interests of the party and 
the country as a whole. For a specific interest, it will be a challenge to stand out 
among the plenty.  
Considering the difficulty a specific sectoral interest faces in “surving” this process 
of  aggregation,  we  would  argue  that in  order to  stand  out  among  a  variety of 
interests, two conditions have to be met. First of all,  the intensity of the interest 
(or preference) has to be such that it triggers a sufficiently high level of inside 
and  outside  lobbying  so  that  it  outperforms  the  voice  of  all,  or  most  other, 
interests in society. Secondly, it is necessary that the neglect by the officeholders 
of  that  voice  comes  at  a  substantial  electoral  cost  for  the  political  party  as  a 
whole. In the latter, the characteristics of the electoral system play an important 
role. 
If we apply the above described reasoning to the case of labour standards,  the 
lack of instance on labour standards in bilateral trade agreements by the EU can 
be explained by the prominent role of the  EU’ s Council of Ministers in policy-
making on trade and the strong role that political parties play in the aggregation 
processes inside this institution. Even if there is variance in the range of party 
disciplines across the different Member States, they all share the fact that such 
discipline  is  significant  for  the  way  in  which  their  parliamentary  and 
governmental  institutions  operate.  As  a  consequence,  internal  party  interest 
aggregation  mechanisms  are  prevalent,  and  with  it  the  role  that  collective 
interests play in such aggregation.  
Different  interests  are  balanced  against  each  other  and  against  the  overall 
interests  of  the  party,  and  eventually  of  the  nation.  Local  interests  have  less 
                                                             
10 Note that even if the scale of the electoral districts has an impact on the power that political parties can exert 
over the electives officeholders, the relationship between the two is neither linear, nor excessively strong. It is 
indeed a relationship that is mediated by a range of other factors, including inter alia the nature of the candidate 
selection within the party, and the constitutional set-up of the governmental system, most prominently its system 
of institutional checks and balances.  
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chance  to  weigh  heavily  here  unless  they  are  able  to  reach  a  high  level  of 
intensity on the one hand, and to benefit from the institutional characteristics of 
the  electoral  system  on  the  other  hand. This  may  be  the case  for  agricultural 
interests, but is much less so for trade-related labour standards. As a matter of 
fact,  the  much  more  extensively  developed  welfare  state  systems  (cf.  Sapir’s 
analysis),  smoothen  the impact  that  trade liberalization  has  on  employees  and 
with it the incentives for a substantial part (but not  all) of them to raise their 
voice  and  to  engage in political  activism.  For the political parties,  the  electoral 
incentives to include strong labour standards in international trade agreements 
against  the  opposition  from  developing  countries  is  therefore,  relatively  weak. 
Consequently, the pressure from EU governments in the EU Council of Ministers 
is  relatively  low  as  well,  as  is  the  pressure  in  the  national  parliaments  when 
international  trade  agreements  concluded  by  the  EU  need  to  be  approved  as 
mixed  agreements.  Moreover,  it  even  seems  that  this  relatively  low  pressure 
creates  a  situation  in  which  disputes  about  competences  on  social  policy 
supersede the question of the inclusion of labour standards in international trade 
agreements concluded by the EU.  
Interest Aggregation in National Parliaments and the EU-ACP-Council of 
Ministers 
In order to capture the “aggregation” mechanisms taking place at the level of the 
Member States with respect to EU-ACP relations, we have chosen to proceed with 
two limited yet revealing empirical tests. First, we will look at positions taken by 
Members of Parliament in the ratification process of the Cotonou-Agreement in 
two Member States for which we expect to find a strong preference on the labour-
trade linkage: the United Kingdom and Belgium.11 In a second step, we will look 
at the salience of specific issues with respect to the Cotonou-acquis in the Joint 
EU-ACP-Councils  held  after  the  signature  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement.  In  both 
empirical tests, we will try to identify the importance given to  general (national) 
party interests in comparison with more locally based sectoral interests such as 
labour standards. 
The  ratification  procedure  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement  in  Belgium’s  Federal 
Parliament started in September 2002 when a legislative  proposal to ratification 
was  submitted  to  the  Senate.  In  the  Senate,  this  proposal  was  discussed  in 
plenary session in October, where representatives from both the Socialist Party 
(PS) and the Christian Democrats (CDH) intervened. The interventions showed 
some points of convergence  as they were both critical on the reciprocity based 
                                                             
11 Indeed, in the past both the UK and Belgium have been respectively strong opponents and proponents of a 
labour-trade linkage (Waer, 1996: 26, Burgoon, 2000:202)  
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trade regime aimed at in the agreement but welcomed the importance given to 
human rights, good governance and the rule of law in the Agreement (OD 23).  
The proposal was transferred to the House of Representatives and discussed in 
the  External  Relations  Committee  in  November  where  a  representative  of  the 
Green Party (AGALEV/ECOLO) stressed the importance of the inclusion of civil 
society in the implementation of the Cotonou-Agreement, as established by the 
text  of  the  Agreement  itself  (OD  24).  Moreover,  the  Green  representative 
regretted  the  fact  that  the  partnership  principle  enshrined  by  previous  Lomé-
conventions had been replaced by  a “mere economic”  agreement. Nonetheless, 
the proposal was adopted in both Houses almost unanimously.12 
A proposal to approve the review of the Cotonou-Agreement has been submitted 
to the Senate at the end of 2006. However, no discussions related to this proposal 
have yet taken place. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  order  of  approval  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement  was 
submitted  to  both  the  House  of Commons  and the  House  of  Lords in October 
2001,  where  they  were  approved  without  major  problems.  In  the  House  of 
Commons, the order was first presented by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State  for  International  Development  (Labour  Party),  to  the  Ninth  Standing 
Committee  on  Delegated  Legislation.  The  Labour  Minister  defended  the 
agreement referring to the fact that all the UK’s main objectives were achieved 
(poverty  reduction  as  main  objective,  re-affirmation  of  essential  elements  of 
human rights, democracy and rule of law, importance of good governance).  In 
the  discussions  following  this  “order  of  approval”,  representatives  from  the 
Conservative  Party,  on  the  one  hand,  applauded  the  incorporation  of  anti-
corruption  measures  in  the  Cotonou-Agreement,  but  they  regretted  the 
inconsistency  with  the  national  International  Development  Bill,  where  such 
provisions  were  not  included.  With  respect  to  the  link  between  the  Cotonou-
Agreement  and  the  “Everything  But  Arms”  (EBA)  Initiative,  Conservative 
representatives  also  stressed  the  need  to  protect  Caribbean  economies  in  the 
process of liberalization of Europe’s sugar-market (OD27). The Liberal-Democrats, 
on  the  other  hand,  emphasized  the  need  to  ensure  more  simplified  technical 
procedures  in  the  implementation  of  EU  aid  in  the  framework  of  Cotonou,  in 
order  to  allow  more  small  UK  grass-root  organizations  to  implement  these 
European projects.  Moreover,  they  expressed  more  general concerns  about  the 
EU’s  role  in  international  trade.  In  this  respect  they  mentioned  the  attention 
given  to  the  “development”-aspect  of  the  Doha  Development  Round  and  the 
interests of Caribbean banana-producers in the EU’s bananas-dispute (OD28). 
                                                             
12  In  the  Senate,  the  proposal  was  adopted  with  50  in  favour  and  6  abstentions  (OD25)  .  In  the  House  of 
Representatives, 80 voted in favour, 2 against and 1 abstained (OD 26)  
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In  the  House  of  Lords,  where  the  motion  of  approval  was  introduced  by  the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
similar  issues  were  raised  to  the  attention.  The  governmental  representative 
(Labour Party) explained the main mechanisms of the Cotonou-Agreement in a 
similar  way  as  her  colleague  did  in  the  House  of  Lords.  Conservative 
representatives welcomed the incorporation of anti-corruption measures (with its 
inconsistencies  with  the  International  Development  Bill)  and  insisted  on  the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy as 
other means to increase the participation of ACP countries to international trade 
(OD29). Equally, they expressed their concerns on the EBA and Cotonou-regimes 
on  sugar  and  its  implications  particularly  for  the  Carribean  region.  Liberal 
Democrats  stressed  the importance  of  the inclusion  of civil society in  the  EPA 
negotiations  and  expressed  their  concerns  on  the  participation  of  developing 
countries to WTO-negotiations (OD30). 
Just like in the Belgian case, the review of the Cotonou-Agreement has not yet 
been discussed in the UK Parliament.  
Both cases show clearly that, despite of the important place of labour standards in 
the text of the Cotonou-Agreement, they do not seem to reach a place of priority 
when Member States were ratifying the Agreement. Instead, attention was given 
to  the  promotion  of  democratic  principles  and  good  governance  through  the 
Agreement and the important implications of the new trading regime proposed 
(in the case of the UK, particularly for economies in the Caribbean). The objective 
of promoting labour standards seems to have  disappeared in the light of other 
more general political objectives when societal interests where aggregated by the 
parliamentary representatives.  
The second empirical test proposed is connected with the important role of the 
ACP-EU Council of  Ministers in  the management  of  EU-ACP relations. Indeed, 
Article  15  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement  provides  for  a  key  role  for  the  ACP-EU-
Council  of  Ministers,  consisting  of  members  of  the  Council  of  the  EU,  the 
European Commission and a member of government of each ACP state. As the 
Council is in charge of adopting political guidelines and taking decisions required 
for the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement, the issues raised in 
this  institutional  setting  are  particularly  important  to  get  a  grip  on  the  real 
priorities of the EU-ACP relations during the last years. Again, we will try to verify 
to which extent labour standards have made it to the agenda of the Joint-Council. 
Meetings of the Joint-Council are held on a yearly basis. In 2000 and 2001, the 
main points of the agenda were related to trade. In this respect, technical trade 
related assistance and ACP concerns related to both the reform of the EU’s Sugar 
Protocol and the EU’s banana-disputes were discussed (OD31&OD32). Moreover,  
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both  ACP-countries  and  the  EU  concentrated  on  preparations  of  the  WTO 
Ministerial  Conference  in  Doha,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  discussion  on 
TRIPS and access to medicines (OD31). Next to attention to the multilateral level, 
initial preparations were made for the start of the EPA negotiations. Inspite of the 
strong  emphasis on trade, a report from the ministerial committee on the EDF 
leftovers was discussed and  a Joint Declaration on Climate Change was adopted 
(OD32).  Moreover  the Council  had  an  exchange  of  views  on  a communication 
from the ACP/EU economic and social partners, even though  no decisive steps 
were taken in this regard (OD32).  
In 2002 and 2003, the same “trade and aid-topics” were prominent: reform of the 
Sugar Protocol, the EU’s bananas-disputes, trade related assistance, institutional 
preparations  for  the  EPA-negotiations  and  the  implementation  of  the  9
th  EDF 
(OD33&OD34). Nonetheless, more political themes made it to the agenda as well. 
Discussions were held on the participation of civil society to EPA negotiations and 
the  concrete  implementation  of  the  “political  dialogue”-mechanisms  of  the 
Agreement. Moreover, the start of Article 96 Consultations with Zimbabwe was 
discussed. Last, a meeting with representatives of civil society on the theme of 
good governance was held in the framework of the Joint-Council of 2003 (OD33).  
The 2004 and 2005 Joint Councils were dominated to a large extent by the 2005 
review of the Cotonou-Agreement, even though trade topics remained important. 
With  respect  to  the  “trade-issues”,  EU  and  ACP-countries  tried  to  agree  on 
principles  and  objectives  to  guide  the  negotiations  of  the  EPA’s  and  additional 
discussions  were  held  on  the  trade  regimes  in  sugar,  bananas  and  cotton 
(OD35&OD36).  As  the  review  of  the  Cotonou-Agreement  mainly  concerned 
changes  in  the  political  dimensions  of  the  Agreement,  political  topics  were 
discussed more extensively than before. The discussions mainly concerned the 
degree  of  formalization  of  the  political  dialogue  enshrined  in  Article  8  of  the 
agreement prior to Article 96 consultations. One of the wishes of the EU in this 
respect was to keep the right to unilaterally start these consultations. Next to the 
political-dialogue  provisions,  the  inclusion  of    clauses  on  Weapons  of  Mass 
Destruction, the International Criminal Court and cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism were additional topics (OD35 & OD36).  
Last,  in  2006,  next  to  numerous  discussions  and  disagreements  on  the 
“development-dimension” of  EPA’s, a joint declaration on Climate Change  was 
adopted (OD37). Moreover, one EU-ACP Ministerial Debate on the link between 
Migration and Development (the first of its kind) and a EU-ACP Heads of States 
Summit took place aimed at looking at the six ACP regions from the perspective 
of peace, security and stability (OD37).  
  18 
The above shows almost unambiguously that the priorities of the EU-ACP Joint 
Council crystallized  around  the  trade  dimension  of  the Cotonou-Agreement  on 
the one hand and the political dialogue provisions of the Agreement on the other 
hand.  Only in two occasions, when a communication from the ACP/EU economic 
and social partners was discussed in 2001 and when negotiations were held on 
the  mechanisms  to  include  civil  society  in  the  EPA  negotiations  in  2003,  the 
“social dimension” of the EU-ACP relations came briefly under the spotlight. The 
promotion of labour standards as an objective of the Cotonou-Agreement seems 
to have been completely overwhelmed by other more general foreign policy and 
trade priorities in the relations between the EU and the ACP countries. 
Conclusion 
In the study of the role of the EU in the world, the notion of “normative power 
Europe”  has  become  very  influential.  In  this  respect,    Manners  has  made  a 
distinction between Europe’s “core norms” such as democracy, liberty, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and minor norms 
such  as  social  solidarity,  sustainable  development  and  good  governance 
(Manners, 2002:242).  
When  we  look  at  the  EU’s  commitment  to  promote  labour  standards  in  its 
relations with the ACP countries, this hierarchy of norms can only be confirmed. 
Social solidarity (or social rights) has not been pursued by the EU with the same 
level of perseverance as other core norms such as democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.  
Instead  of  looking  at  the  EU  as  a  normatively  constructed  polity  in  order  to 
explain this discrepancy between core norms and secondary norms, we have tried 
to explain the difference in the EU’s behaviour by looking at variables related to 
the  political economy of EU decision-making. Two crucial variables  have been 
identified:  the prominence  of  the  Member  States  when  negotiating  association 
agreements  with  third countries  and  the  aggregative role of political parties in 
European democracies. The impact of both variables have shown that preferences 
and institutions, both within the Member States and at the EU-level, matter.  
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